An offensive containment strategy based on Malware's attack patterns by Pan, J. & Fung, C.C.
Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics, Tianjin, 14-17 July, 2013 
AN OFFENSIVE CONTAINMENT STRATEGY BASED ON MALWARE'S 
ATTACK PATTERNS 
JONATHAN PAN, eHUN eHE FUNG 
School of Engineering and Information Technology, Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia, Australia 
E-MAIL: jonathan.pan.jy@gmail.com.l.fung@murdoch.edu.au 
Abstract: 
Malware has become a major problem to organizations and 
they are becoming more sophisticated in many ways. They have 
abilities to penetrate through deployed defensive measures and 
stay active while resisting containment responses. Malware are 
also evading and attacking the defenses put up by organizations. 
The classical containment techniques to contain a successful 
infiltration of Malware have limited effectiveness against the 
determined and resilient malice. This paper advocates using the 
offensive techniques typically used by Malware to disable them 
as part of the containment response. In this paper, two 
experiments involving the application of offensive techniques on 
different Malware are presented. One of which involves a 
smartphone Malware. The result of this experiments 
demonstrate applicability of such techniques as part of 
containment response. 
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1. Introduction 
Today Malware is a major problem for organizations. 
There are many anti-Malware products available in the 
market for an organization to use to defend itself. Defenses 
like Firewall, Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) and 
Anti-Virus (AV) are intended to protect the organization's 
ICT assets. These defenses are becoming ineffective in both 
keeping the Malware at bay and contained. AUSCERT 
reckons that 80% of the Anti-Virus solutions are ineffective 
in detecting and removing Malware [1]. In a report by 
MessageLab, it noted that out of 31 Anti-Virus companies, 
only 6 recognized the malicious file to contain a Malware [2]. 
Besides these defenses are becoming ineffective against new 
Malware, they are also becoming victims of attacks by 
Malware as part of the latter's self-preservation strategy [9]. 
The starting point of this security problem with Malware is 
their ability to infiltrate. This is typically done through the 
weakest link in our defense strategy, that is, our human 
behaviors. One went as far as to comment that it is people's 
stupidity that led to security lapses [3]. Hence Malware will 
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inevitably infiltrate past the defense boundaries and when 
they do, it needs to be quickly contained before they induce 
greater damage to the organizations. However containment 
techniques used today are constantly being challenged to 
match the sophistication of Malware. 
This research advocates that one can apply the 
notoriously successful offensives techniques used by the 
Malware, which include techniques used to attack the 
deployed defenses, back against the malice, as part of the 
containment response strategy for an organization whose IT 
assets are controlled by Malware. The context of this research 
excludes the identification and analysis of the Malware. The 
next section of this paper provides an overview of the 
proposition. A survey of related researches follows. This is 
then be followed by a description of the evaluation 
experiments and an analysis of the experimental results. 
Finally, a conclusion with considerations for future research 
options completes this paper. 
2. Malware: An Organization's Epidemic 
When a Malware successfully gets past the defenses and 
infects the organization's computing hosts, there will be 
many risks induced to the organization. Such Malware may 
use the infected computers to steal classified data, launch 
attacks on other computing resources or disrupt business 
operations. Control over IT assets is important to 
organizations. The objective of the Malware is to gain control 
over the organization's IT assets in order to achieve its 
malicious objectives. 
An organization would typically respond by deploying a 
security incident response team to contain the infection and 
mitigate the effects of the Malware attack. Some 
organizations have a formal team called CSIRT (Computer 
Security Incident Response Team) who is responsible with 
such risks. According to the Malware Attribute Enumeration 
and Characterization (or MAEC), which is a Malware 
knowledge framework and repository defined by MITRE, the 
handling of Malware when the Malware successfully gets 
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pass the defenses is known as Malware Remediation [12]. 
The focus of this research is on Malware Remediation where 
the objective is to contain the Malware infection within an 
organization and restore control of IT assets, as much as 
possible, back to the organization. 
The challenges faced by security incident responders or 
CSIRTs in this reactive stage is the ineffectiveness of current 
techniques to contain a Malware outbreak or infection to 
minimize further risks escalation and ideally to eradicate the 
risks totally. 
2.1. Malware are becoming More Resilient 
The challenge posed to CSIRT is the sophistication of 
Malware's offensive and resilient techniques that gives the 
'dark side' an edge over the defenders (CSIRT) [4]. Malware 
that preserves itself by attacking anti-virus software are 
known as retrovirus or retroworm [5]. Malware are also 
exploiting the vulnerabilities or reconfiguring the defenses in 
order to defunct these defenses [6]. Besides eradicating the 
defenses or rendering them defunct as a means to preserve 
the Malware, the Malware may attack the operating integrity 
of these defenses to induce a false negative assessment of the 
situation. According to Vass about Storm Worm [7], the AV 
was put into such a state in order to circumvent the network 
access control (NAC) with quarantine capability that will 
inhibit unsecure clients from connecting to the network. 
Malware are also increasingly resilient against defense 
mechanisms or solutions thrown at them. Other notable 
attributes of Malware advancement include self-preservation, 
self-healing and self-updating capabilities. Malware also have 
anti-forensic capabilities to prevent any forensic or analysis 
attempts to be done on them in order to contain them [6]. 
Brand et. al [8] cited various anti-forensics mechanisms that 
have been incorporated into modem Malware like anti-online 
analysis which prevents online analysis from being able to 
analyse the Malware; anti-dissemblers to prevent reverse 
engineering the Malware, and, anti-tools which exploit the 
vulnerabilities of the analysis tools being applied to them. 
Malware developers are constantly updating or advancing 
their Malware products to be able to withstand containment 
or response measures taken against the Malware [11]. 
2.2. Classic Containment Techniques Need Update 
CSIRTs typically contain a Malware incident using a 
range of countermeasure techniques through user 
participation, automated detection, disabling services and 
disabling connectivity [9]. Other countermeasures to contain 
Malware include sinkholing or taking down the C&C server 
[10]. However, according to Leder et. al [10], such classical 
techniques have their limitations as there are mechanisms 
built into Malware to overcome them. Leder et. al cited that 
during containment, there may be cross boundary limitations 
that will constraint containment efforts. This is especially true 
when there are external entities that control in-between 
infrastructure and are used by the organization's computing 
platform. An example of such condition is when remote or 
mobile computing is used. Unlike non-mobile or stationary 
computing hosts where the supporting infrastructure like 
networks ingress or egress channels are likely to be managed 
by the organization directly or indirectly hence enabling 
containment techniques like sinkholing. Mobile or remote 
computing will typically operate outside of such protected or 
controlled environments. Additionally, containment 
techniques are openly known to all including Malware 
developers hence this gives the Malware developers an edge 
to incorporate counter-measure against such known 
techniques or mechanisms into their Malware products. 
3. Research Proposition 
The supporting premise to this research proposition is 
that if Malware is attacking specific software like 
anti-Malware or security applications to preserve itself and it 
has proven to be effective, then the same technique can be 
used to defunct them as part of containment. A detailed 
analysis report on Conficker [11] reported that the variant C 
of the Malware explicitly terminates running security 
software. In order to defme and structure the technique used 
by Conficker Variant C among the many possible attack 
techniques that can be used by Malware, the Mitre's 
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification 
(CAPEC) [12] is used as a reference as it is the body of 
knowledge on attack patterns. CAPEC is used by MAEC [12], 
which the latter defines the behavior and characteristics of 
Malware, to define the Malware's offensive behaviors. As 
new techniques are being developed by hackers and 
incorporated into Malware, the body of knowledge will be 
similarly updated and then can be considered as containment 
technique options. Hence using CAPEC, Malware's attack 
techniques can be studied and be evaluated for use by CSIRTs 
as techniques for Malware containment. The first part of this 
study involved an analysis of the attack pattern repository in 
order to assess the suitability of these techniques for 
containment purposes. From the analysis, it is noted that there 
are many techniques that can be used for containment of 
malware. For example, CAPEC-165 (File Manipulation) 
which is about manipulating files' contents or attributes 
required by a software or Operating System can be used to 
defunct a Malware which is a software too. This is done so on 
the Malware's files in which the Malware is dependent upon 
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for normal execution. Another is CAPEC-96 (Block Access 
to Libraries) can be used to block the Malware software from 
attempting to gain access to certain external libraries hence 
limiting its functionality. There are some techniques from 
CAPEC that are not applicable in the context of containment. 
An example is the offensive techniques used in physical 
penetration which is not software based. However, Malware 
are malicious software. 
4. Related Work 
Leder et. al [10] argued that due to the advancement of 
Malware, conventional or classical containment techniques 
need to be complemented with offensive approaches. In their 
research, it has been shown that offensive techniques like 
counter hacking, which are proactive countermeasures, are 
effective in combating Malware. However their research 
study did not advocate the use of any form of knowledge 
repository as a body of knowledge that CSIRT could leverage 
upon. Szor commented [5] that launching a counterattack that 
includes the use of exploit codes or network messages against 
infected machines is considered a network level defense 
strategy. However there are concerns about using such 
techniques against remote systems that do not belong to the 
organization. This is not applicable in this context as the 
intended techniques are meant to be used within an 
organization that has full control and ownership over all its IT 
assets. Leder et al. [10] noted the constraints brought about 
by ethical and legal concerns in the use of such offensive 
techniques. In this context, such techniques can be authorized 
through the organization's policy and invoked only within the 
environment and context of the organization. Hence the 
ethical and legal concerns may not apply as such measures 
are only applied if the IT equipment and information 
involved belong to the individual or the organization. 
From the research survey carried out in this study, it is 
gathered that there is no research that has proposed the use of 
structured knowledge of attack patterns used by Malware and 
to consider them for reuse as part of the containment strategy. 
In fact, the limited formally known number of classical 
containment techniques are, in a sense, a form of offensive 
techniques. The following is a mapping of CAPEC to 
classical containment techniques [9], [10] that can be used to 
defunct the Malware beyond using the anti-Malware tools. 
A. Containment Through Automated Detection [9] -
CAPEC-157 (Sniffing Attacks) 
B. Containment through Disabling Services [9] -
CAPEC-272 (Protocol Manipulation) 
C. Containment through Disabling Connectivity [9] -
CAPEC-161 (Infrastructure Manipulation) 
D. Taking Down the C&C Server [10] - CAPEC-202 
(Client-Server Protocol Manipulation) 
E. Sink Holing [10] - CAPEC-161 (Infrastructure 
Manipulation) 
5. Methodology 
In order to verify that offensive techniques based on 
attack patterns can be used in containment of malware, two 
experiments have been carried out and the results were 
analysed to assess their effectiveness. The main hypothesis in 
the experiments is that Malware's offensive behavior can be 
used to contain a Malware in an infected computer. The 
primary independent variable is the technique used in the 
containment. The primary dependent variable is the state of 
Malware infection on an infected computer. The other 
controlled variables that were manipulated in the two 
experiments were the different Malware used and the 
computing platform where the infection would occur. One of 
the experiments was done on a Windows XP environment 
and the other was done on an Android smartphone platform. 
This variable of different platforms does not directly affect 
the hypothesis. The variation of Malware and computing 
platforms used would only result in a variation to the 
independent variable that is the offensive techniques to be 
used. The general approach used in both experiments was to 
collect sample Malware in order to infect a designated host, 
the gathering of Malware analysis reports that contain 
Malware characteristic details of the collected Malware 
samples as the scope of this research is not in area of analysis 
or detection but on the later stages of the execution of 
containment. Offensive techniques were then identified based 
on the gathered information about the characteristics of the 
Malware involved. The designated host was infected and 
verified to ensure that the infection was successfully carried 
out. This verification may be done through Anti-Virus scan or 
forensic analysis. This will be the pre-test step of the 
experiment. Next the offensive technique(s) were applied to 
the designated host. Finally a final verification was carried 
out to ensure that the Malware has been eradicated or defunct 
from the designated host using either an Anti-Virus software 
or forensic analysis. This will be the post-test step of the 
experiment. 
There were limits in carrying out the experiments 
specifically for the latter experiment. The use of Android 
emulator limits attempts to gain root access rights to execute 
the offensive technique. Given this limitation, some of the 
steps that require rooting of the Android to better control the 
host cannot be tested. Rooting provides administrative right 
privileges to carry out operating system level actions like 
terminating of process or changing operating system 
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configuration. However to work around that, the Android 
Debug Bridge (ADB) was used, which is a command line 
tool that permits communication with the Android emulator 
instance and issue shell like commands with root privileges. 
5.l. Experiment 1 
The objective of the experiment is to show that offensive 
techniques can be used to contain a Malware on a desktop. 
The experiment involved a known Malware 
'IRClBackDoor.SdBot4.FOV' (according Anti-Virus product 
AVG). Most Anti-Virus software have the required signature 
to detect and eradicate the malware. The Malware infected a 
standard personal computer running Windows XP (equipped 
with Service Pack 2). No Internet connection was provisioned 
for this test. The offensive techniques used in this experiment 
were manually executed with no assistance of any tools 
except for registry editors or task manager (process manager). 
The techniques were applied locally on the targeted host. 
They involved terminating the malicious application, forced 
deletion of malicious files and reversing the changes made to 
the infected Operating System as illustrated below. The 
CAPEC referenced techniques used in this experiment is 
CAPEC-203: Manipulate Application Registry Values and 
CAPEC-17: Accessing, Modifying or Executing Executable 
Files. The experiment first infected the targeted host with the 
active protection of Anti-Virus disabled. This facilitates a 
successful initial infection. An Anti-Virus (AVG) scan was 
initiated to confirm the infection. 
The offensive techniques were then applied manually. 
This involved manual termination of the Malware's process 
using the Task Manager and removal of the Malware's 
registry settings . 
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Figure 1: Removal Of Malware's Registry Settiog 
Following the execution of offensive procedures, 
anti-Malware (AVG) scan was done to verify that the 
computer is cleaned from the Malware. 
This test demonstrates the effectiveness of 
self-preservation offensive techniques used by Malware to 
attack anti-Malware products can be re-used against Malware 
as part of Malware containment. 
5.2. Experiment 2 
The objective of the experiment is to show that offensive 
techniques can be used to contain a Malware on an Android 
smartphone mobile platform. The reason for conducting this 
test is because there is a notable increasing trend in Malware 
attacking smartphone mobile platform [l3]. The setup of the 
environment involved a laptop with Ubuntu that had 
Google's Android SDK and Emulator. No Internet connection 
was provisioned in this test. The Malware involved was the 
trojan "AndroidiGeinimi.A" (according to McAfee). 
Anti-Virus software (free version of AVG Mobile) used in 
this experiment had signature information about the Malware. 
The offensive techniques used were manually applied using 
Android's ADB shell commands. The CAPEC techniques 
used were the same as previously experiments. The first part 
of the experiment is the infection of the targeted host 
(emulated Android). 
A simple forensic check was done based on the Malware 
Analysis report to verify the execution of the malware. The 
check involved looking out for a specific open listening port 
that the Malware was using. Offensive techniques were then 
applied to defunct the Malware. 
Figure 2: Remotely Terminate Malware Process 
A final step to uninstall the Trojan was manually 
initiated as part of the containment to completely remove the 
Malware from the Android. A subsequent scan by the 
Anti-Virus (AVG) was done to confirm that the Malware has 
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been removed. 
6. Analysis of Results 
The following outlines the review considerations done 
over the two experiments that were carried out. They 
compromise of the effectiveness of containment approach -
whether the containment techniques applied managed to 
defunct the Malware on the infected platform, enhancement 
options including automating the process, ability to carry out 
the containment remotely on infected hosts with the remote 
host issuing containment instructions, limits or constraints 
posed by the threat, limits or constraints posed by the 
experiment environment, possible residual or consequential 
effects from the containment approach used, overheads 
induced by the approach used and finally applicability to an 
organization's containment tactics. 
6.1. Experiment I 
While the techniques used in this experiment were 
simple and seemed rudimentary, the techniques worked in 
that the Malware was completely eradicated to the extent that 
the Anti-Virus did not find any traces of the Malware after the 
techniques were applied. The benefit of having simple 
techniques is that they too can easily be automated. The 
selected techniques used in this experiment may not be 
applicable to more advanced Malware like Rootkits which 
hide themselves within the kernel of the Operating System. 
However the intent to use offensive techniques was still 
applicable. In this experiment, the techniques were applied 
locally on the targeted host. Remote application can be 
considered in future experiments. If the techniques were 
applied to the wrong process or application image or registry 
settings, the impact could be adverse. The Operating System 
may become unstable if the applied techniques were used 
against an important component of the Operating System. 
The experiment demonstrated that such techniques could be 
used to defunct Malware on an infected host. 
6.2. Experiment 2 
The experiment demonstrated that the Android 
smartphone mobile Malware could be defunct using offensive 
technique. Options to enhance this technique may be to 
automate the offensive techniques to be used against the 
Malware. This may be done using a custom built package 
containing the codified version of the offensive technique(s) 
that can be remotely pushed down to the handsets. There 
were limited Malware analysis reports to such contemporary 
Malware. More time was needed to source the report. The use 
of an emulated environment induced a number of constraints 
like the inability to use root rights. As with the other 
experiments, a wrongly applied technique could defunct the 
host instead. As this smartphone mobile platform is a 
relatively new platform, there are fewer knowledge 
repositories available to aid in identifying the remediation 
offensive techniques to use. As smartphones are increasingly 
used in organizations, such offensive techniques will provide 
an additional defense mechanism to deploy. 
6.3. Summary 
In this research, the focus on whether there was 
applicability of attack patterns as offensive containment 
techniques used against Malware. However there were some 
prerequisites to identify the suitable offensive techniques. 
First is to have sufficient understanding of the characteristics 
of the targeted Malware, in order to identify its vulnerability 
attributes of its constructs. Next is to identify the suitable 
techniques required to apply that the specific characteristics 
of the Malware. Also there was a need to assess the 
implication of the selected technique and to refine it as there 
may be subsequent collateral damages. An example of such 
conditions that may require a re-evaluation on the choice of 
technique is when the Malware replaces a key Operating 
System component with its malicious version, removing and 
terminating (like the technique used in Experiment I) that 
malicious component could defunct the host completely. 
Hence the preferred offensive technique may be to use the 
same technique used by the Malware to infect the host (that is, 
to replace the Operating System component with its own). 
The CAPEC referenced technique for such is CAPEC-159 -
Redirect Access To Libraries. There are known Malware like 
W32.Miroot.Worm or Backdoor.Lastdoor (both named by 
Symantec) that replaces the Windows Operating System's 
Run32dll.exe that is meant to support the execution of 
program codes in DLL files. 
7. Conclusion & Future Directions 
Malware are going against individual researchers or 
developers of anti-Malware solutions. The state of the war is 
currently working in favor with the Malware and their 
developers as the defenders are still trying to catch up with 
the 'dark side'. Beyond development of preventive measures, 
reactive measures need to be developed to better manage the 
likely scenario of a successful attack or penetration by a 
Malware. It is necessary to revolutionize the reactive 
approach to contain or remediate Malware as the current 
techniques are proving to be insufficient and inadequate in 
restoring control over IT assets. Hence this paper advocates 
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taking the 'guns' (or Malware's offensive techniques) off 
from the Malware developers and study how they can be used 
against Malware as part of containment. This idea goes 
beyond the conventional approach of studying the 'guns' and 
building defenses to fend ourselves against such 'guns'. 
Implementing the proposed may give us the needed 
advancement jump to level off against the adversary. An 
analogy is the use of fIre to fIght fIre like in the case of 
initiating Contained Burning to manage a fIre outbreak, 
Malware like techniques can be used to contain a Malware 
infection or outbreak. In view that smartphone mobile 
platform is pervasively used and will continue to increase in 
its use, additionally, the number of new Malware being 
introduced to such platforms, there is a need to have an 
additional defense strategy through the use of offensive 
techniques. 
Future research options to this research proposition are 
as follows. 
a. Formalizing the techniques, specifIcally in the 
context of containment, into a body of knowledge 
that can be reused or applied as patterns so that the 
user will be well informed on the strength and 
limitations of each technique. 
b. DefIne evaluation criteria of offensive techniques. 
c. Develop ways to reduce collateral effects when 
such offensive techniques are applied. 
d. For mobile Malware, actual mobile handset may be 
used to conduct the experiments. 
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